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Mackenzie King grew apprehensive as he listened to the B.B.C. radio broadcast of Big Ben striking the midnight hour to announce the arrival of 1939. "I thought deeply of the signifi­
cance of the strokes of that bell," he wrote in his diary, 
of what had been saved to the world of anguish, this year, but even 
more of the possibilities of the New Year. The despatches I read this 
afternoon speak of Germany likely to force war because of an interior 
condition and of the possibility of Italy doing the same. It is all part 
of the madness of these dictatorships with their false doctrines and of 
the economic nationalism which has destroyed the friendly inter­
course of nations, and helped to substitute international hate for 
international goodwill. One can only pray that in the Providence of 
God, war may be averted in the new Year.' 
The Canadian prime minister had good reason to feel pessimistic 
about the chances for peace in the coming year. Everywhere he looked the 
world seemed in turmoil, or close to it. The menacing situation in Europe 
remained uppermost in his mind, of course. But the Far East, too, con­
cerned Mackenzie King. As he explained to a visitor in late January after 
being told that Japan had turned aside overtures from Italy and Germany 
to form a military alliance: "I don't trust Japan. I think there is some 
subterfuge here. I am sure all three have had an understanding from the 
beginning."2 By early September he believed that Japan might even try 
to strike at Canada. "What may the Japanese not do in the Orient!" 
he exclaimed in his diary. "There are raiders and submarines on both the 
Atlantic and the Pacific coasts, and pocket cruisers. I have no doubt that 
we shall have some bombing of our coast and possibly some inland bombing 
as well."3 
In many ways, Japan's pursuit of a "New Order" in the Far East forced 
a larger dilemma on Canada than the one created by European circum­
stances. On the one hand, policy makers in Ottawa were well aware that 
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Canada had limited interests in the Far East, and even more aware that 
these were not worth fighting over.' On the other hand, they realized that 
Far Eastern developments (and their response to them) could have a dis­
astrous impact on Canada's position between Britain and the United 
States. For, unlike the situation in Europe, where Anglo-American rela­
tions generally harmonized, in the Far East relations between Britain and 
the United States were characterized by a growing rivalry.5 The danger of 
becoming entangled in an Anglo-American rift was all too obvious to that 
small group of men in Ottawa mindful of the impact that diverging 
American and British interests had on Canadian foreign policy during the 
Far Eastern Crisis in 1932.6 Worse still was the possibility of getting 
dragged into a war with Japan either through the United States or Britain 
and the potential threat that posed to national unity. This had been appar­
ent at least since the mid-1930's.7 It became something of a reality in 1939 
because, while a crisis erupted over the Danzig Corridor in Poland during 
the summer, a crisis of equal magnitude raged over the British Concession 
at the Chinese treaty port of Tientsin. Canada came close to facing the 
prospect of entering a war against Japan instead of against Germany. 
At the heart of Canada's Far Eastern dilemma lay the "undeclared" 
Sino-Japanese war, which had been escalating since its outbreak in July 
1937. By the beginning of 1939 the Japanese occupied more than 1,500,000 
square kilometres of Chinese territory and they had claimed some 800,000 
Chinese lives. Through a series of earlier offensives, the Imperial Army 
had captured key strategic centres in China, notably Canton and Hankow, 
and had forced the National Government of Chiang Kai-shek to retreat to 
Chungking. Then, in November and December 1938, the Japanese govern­
ment issued a number of statements calling for a "New Order" in East Asia. 
This was followed by a triple-pronged policy designed to destroy the 
Chinese war effort by wooing the Germans into converting the 1936 Anti-
Comintern Pact into a military alliance against the Soviet Union (in the 
belief that by neutralizing a potential Soviet threat from the north, the 
Japanese war effort would somehow receive a boost); by exploiting the 
growing rift within the Kuomintang between Chiang and Wang Ching-wei; 
and by seeking to undermine Chinese currency. None of these measures 
worked. The Germans wanted a military alliance that was directed at all 
powers instead of merely against the Soviet Union. Wang defected and 
began negotiations with the Japanese for setting up a puppet government 
in the occupied territory, but they dragged on until 1940. The attempt to 
undermine Chinese currency was similarly thwarted by British and 
American stabilization loans to China. 
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Ultimately, the failure to achieve these objectives only hardened the 
Japanese determination to bring China to its knees. Throughout 1939 Japan 
sought to tighten its hold on the occupied areas and to make a more 
concerted attack on the ever-faltering Chinese currency. Initial moves in 
this direction were made with the seizure of Hainan Island off the South 
China Coast in February and the prohibition of North Chinese currency 
(fapi) in March. This was accompanied by new and more threatening ges­
tures towards Britain, the one country that Japan began to view as the chief 
obstacle to its ambitions in the Far East. The aim was to drive a wedge 
between the United States and Britain and then to force the British into a 
Far Eastern "Munich" by exerting pressure on the International 
Settlements at Shanghai, Amoy, and the island of Kulangsu, and especially 
on the British Concession at Tientsin.8 
These developments were closely watched in Canada, but Ottawa 
could do little to influence their outcome.9 In early January, O.D. Skelton, 
the under-secretary of state for external affairs, and Mackenzie King's trusted 
advisor, pointed out that the "Japanese invasion of China has not yet been 
checked. Practically all the northern and eastern territories, and particu­
larly the industrial and commercial centres, have been conquered." 
Although he believed that the likelihood of British or American military 
intervention remained small as long as Japan did not threaten their vital 
interests, he could perceive a hardening in the attitude of both London and 
Washington in the direction of a "definite possibility of an attempt to use 
economic weapons."10 So far as Skelton was concerned, the imposition of 
economic sanctions against Japan would lead to war and there was no sign 
that the Americans or the British were willing to give each other a military 
commitment before applying sanctions." He wanted the Canadian 
government to remain neutral and to avoid pursuing any policy that could 
provoke Japan. As was usually the case, Skelton expressed particular con­
cern over British policy and the limited options left to Canada: 
It is very illuminating as to the forces behind much of British foreign 
policy to note how aloof the British Government was when it was only 
a question of rescuing China from murder and loot, and how inter­
ested she is becoming when it is a question of saving the trade of 
British firms in Shanghai which hitherto have been very pro-Japanese 
and contemptuous of China. Meanwhile Canada is supposed never to 
think of her own interests in foreign policy." 
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The under-secretary may have been overestimating the political 
influence of British trading firms, but his observation regarding the threat 
to British interests was correct. In late January Hugh Keenleyside, the 
Department of External Affairs' resident expert on Far Eastern matters, 
reported that the Japanese prime mimster, Baron Hiranuma, and his foreign 
minister, Arita Hachiro, had recently made statements which "constitute 
one of the most significant contributions to the history of Japanese foreign 
policy since Peary's [sic] 'Black Ships' ended Japanese seclusion in 1854." 
In part of his statement, Baron Hiranuma said: "As for those who fail to 
understand to the end and hereafter persist in the opposition to Japan, we 
have no other alternative than to exterminate them." When the Japanese 
Foreign Office was asked whether this threat applied only to the Chinese, 
an official replied that "the translation is correct as it stands."13 Then, fol­
lowing the Japanese occupation of Hainan Island, Keenleyside warned that 
"[I]f the Japanese retain control of the Island and develop it as a Japanese 
naval base it will finally seal the doom of Hong Kong and it will be a direct 
threat to the usefulness of Singapore ... This action by the Japanese will 
completely alter the strategic situation in the Eastern and Southern 
Pacific." So far as Keenleyside was concerned, the threat to Britain was 
obvious and so, too, was the potential for war." It is interesting to note that 
Britain's Dominions Office, perhaps fearing Ottawa would use the Far 
Eastern situation in order to escape European commitments, downplayed 
the Japanese seizure of Hainan. Within the Foreign Office and the 
Admiralty, however, officials expressed the view that Japan's actions were 
part of a long-range plan to absorb Borneo and Malaya and that the annexation 
of Hainan had been undertaken at the instigation of Germany and Italy." 
Mackenzie King, for his part, sought to remain aloof from Far Eastern 
affairs. His government had adopted an official policy of neutrality shortly 
after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and he was determined to keep 
it that way. The prime minister's uppermost fear was that Canada would 
get dragged into an Anglo-Japanese war (or worse, into a simultaneous 
Anglo-German-Japanese war) without American support. But he was also 
concerned about the possible implications for Canada if the United States 
and Japan became involved in a conflict. He therefore did all that he could 
to prevent Canada from being placed in a situation where it could be held 
responsible for creating an "incident." For example, when the British 
Columbia members of the House of Commons tried to push through an act 
to exclude Japanese immigrants from Canada, he recorded in his diary that 
he warned them of "the position in Japan and the embarrassment which 
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the passing of any exclusion measures would be to the British Government 
and the danger of the reaction to the parts of the Empire."16 The exclu-
sionist policy was subsequentiy blocked in the House, to the great relief of 
the prime minister and, indeed, the British." 
Mackenzie King's acute sensitivity over Canadian involvement in Far 
Eastern matters was further demonstrated by an episode involving Canada's 
charge d'affaires at the Tokyo Legation, E. D'Arcy McGreer, and his wife, 
shortly after the Japanese seizure of Hainan Island in February. Lady Craigie, 
wife of British Ambassador Sir Robert Craigie, was gathering the wives of 
other diplomats together once a week to roll bandages for wounded 
Japanese soldiers. One Japanese newspaper quoted her as saying that she 
thought it was the duty of all women stationed in Tokyo to work hand-in-
hand with the Japanese women because Japan was facing an emergency." 
Recognizing the obvious attempt to mollify the Japanese and unwilling to 
compromise Canada's neutrality, McGreer objected to his wife taking any 
part in the operation. Offended by McGreer's attitude, Craigie stopped by 
the Canadian Legation to tell him that "when I decided that it was quite 
correct to hold these meetings, you also might have known that it was 
quite correct." McGreer explained that if the Canadian public caught wind 
of the situation, his government would be embarrassed. Skelton certainly 
approved of McGreer's stand and condemned Craigie for having "the gall 
to call at the Legation to voice his disapproval of the fact that Mrs. McGreer 
had not been attending these meetings." Mackenzie King was even more 
upset, and wrote a personal note explaining that he not only approved of 
McGreer's position "but would disapprove either he or his wife taking any 
action which in either Canada or Japan might give rise to misunderstand­
ing as to Canada's complete neutrality ... in this Sino-Japanese war."13 
Mackenzie King believed that he had some good reasons for pursuing 
a policy that would prevent Canada from being placed in a position where 
it could be held responsible for creating an international incident. 
International incidents could lead to war and he had no desire to see 
national unity upset by Canadian involvement in any Far Eastern crisis. 
Moreover, as he noted sourly in his diary, a war in Asia was "not worth the 
lives of white men for 'Business Interests'."20 He also believed that Canada 
might be attacked if a war involving either Britain or the United States and 
Japan broke out in the Pacific. On more than one occasion he expressed the 
view that "Japan was very dangerous" and that Canada "might be faced 
with a world situation at any time" which necessitated better defences on 
the west coast.21 
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In feet, Canada military authorities had been expressing increasing 
concern over the defence of British Columbia since the termination of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in the early 1920s and especially since the Far 
Eastern crisis of 1931-33. By 1936 they were warning that "the liability of 
direct attack on Canada by Japanese forces has become a matter requiring 
urgent consideration and action in view of the menacing situation which 
continues to develop in the Far East."" The problem attracting particular 
attention was the maintenance of Canadian neutrality in the event of an 
American-Japanese war, a problem that was further complicated by 
Canadian obligations under the terms of the Anglo-American Treaty of 
1871. The treaty gave Canada sovereignty over sections of the Straits of 
Juan de Fuca, but Japan might argue that these were international waters. 
If Canada failed to prevent the Japanese from entering or utilizing those 
areas, the United States could respond by using their armed forces to pro­
tect their interests.23 The services argued that Canada's geographical prox­
imity to and commercial relations with the United States would leave the 
country open to charges of non-neutrality by either the Americans or the 
Japanese, which could lead to a situation where the United States would 
move arms and men into Canada in order to protect American security, 
thereby violating Canadian sovereignty. "As Canada is, for practical pur­
poses, incapable of resisting such a United States invasion there would be 
no course open except the humiliating one of accepting the violation of her 
sovereign rights," warned military officials.2,1 
Mackenzie King agreed with his military advisors, especially after 
the American president, F.D. Roosevelt, informed him of "having [in] a 
number of leading Senators and asking them the question, what would the 
United States do if Japan attacked British Columbia. The agreement being 
instantly, why, of course, we would go in and help to prevent her getting 
a foothold."25 His apprehension was further fuelled by Roosevelt's 1938 
declaration at Kingston, Ontario, that "the United States will not stand idly 
by if the domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."26 
True, Mackenzie King publicly spoke of Canada's "obligations as good 
friendly neighbour," and said that "should the occasion ever arise, enemy 
forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air, to 
the United States across Canadian territory"27 Privately, however, the 
prime minister was perturbed by Roosevelt's "guarantee." "Roosevelt's 
assurance only added to our responsibilities," he recorded in his diary, 
"that we would have to see that our coasts were so defended that no enemy 
forces could operate from Canadian territory against the United States." 
Toward the end of January 1939 he wrote that he "pointed out to the 
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Cabinet that they must not mistake what the President said at the 
Thousand Islands Bridge; that it was not that the United States would not 
allow Canada to be dominated by any other Empire or country than the 
British. That if she had to come here and save us, the Empire being domi­
nated, it would mean that Canada would become a part of America."2" 
The prime minister and his military officials were by no means the 
only ones expressing concern over the possibility of a Japanese attack on 
the West Coast. In early January 1938 Dr. Chang-Lok Chen, the Chinese 
consul general in Ottawa, delivered a widely reported speech to the 
Ottawa Gyro Club in which he said that "it was folly for Canada to take the 
view that she was secure from all attacks, that the Monroe Doctrine would 
protect her or that England would always be ready to come to her rescue." 
Canadians, he warned, "would 'rue the day' they neglected their western 
defences." Similar comments were made by Thomas Wu, associate editor 
of the Shing Wha Daily News and spokesman for the Ontario Chinese 
Patriotic League, who added; "If anyone with an unbiased mind looks at 
the situation in British Columbia they can see the Japanese menace." In 
addition, there were inflammatory press articles blasting the state of 
Canadian defence.29 
Some allowance must be made for the fact that military authorities 
were seeking to use the Far Eastern situation in order to wring more money 
from the government for a larger defence budget and that Chinese repre­
sentatives were attempting to raise more support in their fight against 
Japan.30 Nevertheless, mounting concern over the Far East led to a secret 
meeting between high-ranking Canadian and American military officials 
in January 1938. Both sides agreed that if war broke out in the Pacific, the 
Japanese would conduct raids on the west coast from cruisers and aircraft 
carriers and the Americans believed that the Japanese would try to use the 
coast of British Columbia as a base for air or submarine operations.31 
Shortly after these meetings, the Canadian General Staff produced an interim 
plan of coast defence.32 
By 1939 there was a genuinely held belief that a Japanese attack on 
Canada, however limited, was a possibility. In late January General T.V. 
Anderson, the chief of the General Staff, drew up a memorandum projecting 
"scales of attack" by Japan which ran as follows: "Occasional medium 
attacks, definite risk of torpedo, bomb or gas attack. Maximum of twelve 
aircraft from enemy cruisers, armed merchant vessels or improvised 
carriers."33 Commodore P.W. Nelles, chief of the Naval Staff, and one of 
276 CANADIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
those who had attended the talks with the Americans in 1938, added to 
Ibis at the end of January with the comment that, though the actions of 
Germany must be given first consideration, "the possible actions of Japan 
must be taken into account." He projected Japanese attacks by "up to 2 5" 
[two five-inch] Cruisers, 2 Submarines, 2 Minelayers, and 2 Armed 
Merchantmen to attack our West Coast ports and/or trade in British 
Columbian waters."" 
As the Far Eastern situation continued to deteriorate, the probability 
of a war in that part of the world involving either Britain or the United 
States became almost as significant for the government as the European 
situation. Ottawa responded by giving priority status to the defence of the 
west coast of Canada until the summer of 1938 and by installing additional 
defences on the Pacific Coast, particularly in the form of artillery. Four of 
Canada's six destroyers were also stationed on the west coast. There was 
also a press campaign designed to demonstrate how well-defended British 
Columbia was." These measures were rather meagre and designed to mol­
lify public opinion more than to provide for a strong defence. For example, 
coastal artillery did not match the range of Japanese battleships. But 
throughout the 1930s the government struggled with financial exigency, 
and it was difficult to raise either public awareness or public support for 
substantive rearmament. 
Increasingly frustrated by their failure to defeat China, the Japanese 
began exerting pressure on the international settlements and especially on 
the British Concession at Tientsin. After a series of minor incidents involv­
ing Chinese terrorists, a crisis broke when the Japanese blockaded the 
British Concession on 14 June 1939. Craigie later wrote that the crisis was 
Like "a volcano whose sudden eruption threw into the political firmament 
all the pent-up feelings and animosities which had been simmering and 
boiling beneath the surface since Japan's invasion of China two years ear­
lier."1' The issues revolved around the circulation of North Chinese cur­
rency, the refusal of the British to hand over some fourteen million dollars 
of Chinese silver reserves sealed in Concession vaults, and the anti-
Japanese activities carried out from the Concession by Chinese guerrillas.37 
The crisis had alarming implications for other parts of the world. 
British policy had been based on the assumption that war would break out 
in Europe first and then perhaps spread to the Far East. Now, as the British 
prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, pointed out, "it looked as though it 
might be the other way round: for, if we sent our fleet to Singapore to deal 
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with Japan, the temptation to the Axis Powers to take advantage of the 
situation would be almost irresistible."38 From Washington, the British 
ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, cautioned London against any action 
"that could be construed as a return to [a] policy of appeasement." He 
warned that concessions to Japan would be made at the risk of alienating 
the United States.39 While expressing a desire to send a fleet to the Pacific, 
the Americans did not want to cooperate with Britain or give a guarantee of 
armed support in the event that Japan pushed the issue to war. 
Though Ottawa remained aloof from the crisis, there was considerable 
concern over what could happen. In early June Lester B. Pearson, first 
secretary in the High Commission in Britain, had informed Ottawa of 
Craigie's analysis of developments in Japanese policy. The ambassador 
reported that Japan was attempting "to drive a wedge" between Britain and 
the United States. Pearson recognized that the Foreign Office did not agree 
with the ambassador, but he believed that there might be some truth to the 
allegation in view of recent Japanese approaches to the United States 
regarding the possibility of finding a solution to the tension in Europe." 
Two days after the blockade of the Concession, Canada's high commis­
sioner to London, Vincent Massey, passed on Craigie's warning that the 
"Japanese may have forced [the] issue at Tientsin, where United States 
interests are not so great, to drive a wedge between the two 
Governments."" Skelton agreed. He believed that from the Japanese 
"standpoint the time was well chosen, with German-Polish relations 
strained, and the Anglo-Russian negotiations up in the air. The place was 
equally well chosen, as the United States has no special interest in 
Tientsin, and it was easier therefore to drive a wedge between Great Britain 
and the United States." Though Skelton did not think that the British 
could retaliate without American support, he began to allow for the shad­
owy prospect of war. "It would be ironical," he wrote to Mackenzie King, 
"if, after declining to take any action against Japan to save the millions of 
Chinese from slaughter and starvation, we should find ourselves engaged 
in economic or military conflict in defence of concessions established 
after the Opium Wars." He went on to suggest that if Canada was asked to 
join in some form of economic retaliation, "we would desire to obtain 
some assurance from Washington as to support in the event of conflict."" 
The type of assurance Skelton wanted from the Americans was not 
forthcoming. From the Washington Legation, Escott Reid reported that, 
although the Americans seemed to be adopting a stiffer policy, it was not 
working out that way in practice: non-interventionist sentiment in 
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Congress was growing, Congress turned down requests for funds to 
improve the harbour at Guam and the naval air base at Wake Island, and 
there was no sign that the American public would back a policy of eco­
nomic sanctions with military force. Moreover, Merchant Mahoney, the 
chargS d'affaires at the Washington Legation, informed Ottawa that the 
chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department told him that "he 
did not foresee new developments in the Far Eastern policy of the United 
States."" In other words, the Americans would continue to sit back and 
await further developments. Without American support, London was 
forced to give Craigie a great deal of latitude to stage as graceful a with­
drawal as possible. After several weeks of hard bargaining, the British had 
to accept the humiliating formula Craigie and the Japanese foreign minister, 
Arita, produced on 24 July as the basis for the negotiation of a settlement 
of the Tientsin crisis.'14 
The British retreat came as a great disappointment to the Americans. 
The secretary of state, Cordell Hull, later wrote that "[I]t was disturbing in 
that Japan had won a victory in her never-ending quest for recognition of 
'special rights,' or 'special interests,' or 'special requirements' in China."45 
On 26 July, the American government gave Japan the necessary six months' 
notice for the termination of the 1911 American-Japanese commercial 
treaty. Washington's move surprised both Tokyo and London. The British 
were delighted at the rebuke delivered to Japan, but they were upset 
because the Americans had not notified them beforehand of the decision. 
Craigie rightly believed that Washington's decision was "just another flash 
in the American pan."46 
Nevertheless, the American decision threw the British government 
into a quandary. The Cabinet discussed the Far Eastern situation at a series 
of meetings in early August and it decided to examine the possibility of 
abrogating the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911, to which 
Canada was a party (it is also worth noting the foreign secretary's comment 
at one of these meetings that "the position in the Far East was now caus­
ing him more anxiety than the position in any other part of the world").47 
On 16 August London asked Ottawa for its views on the denunciation of 
the Commercial Treaty.48 
Ottawa replied to the British request on 21 August. "It has not been 
found possible," the telegram began, "in the brief time thus available to 
secure definitive consideration of the question by the Canadian 
Government... While we consider it is essential for full understanding of 
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the situation ... we do not wish to imply that they would offset our desire 
to cooperate with the United Kingdom and the United States in any action 
which they might take, particularly so in view of the long-range interests 
involved." In the event, the government decided that it would stand by 
Britain.49 But the question had been rather carefully considered even 
before the British made their request and the various discussions clearly 
demonstrated the limited parameters of Canadian policy. Pursuing his cus­
tomary neutralist stance, Skelton wrote on 1 August: "It is not our business 
to offer any advice on the Tientsin negotiations at this eleventh hour, but 
if the negotiations break down and the British decide to follow the United 
States' example in denouncing the treaty, I do not suppose we could do 
otherwise." Nevertheless, he went on to warn that "[I]t must be borne in 
mind that if reprisals are made they will fall largely on Canada, and while 
I do not think there is any likelihood of reprisals taking a military form it 
is clear that if they did come in the Pacific the United Kingdom could not 
give any adequate support."50 
A few days later, one of Skelton's officials, Norman Robertson, pointed 
out that under the Canadian tariff structure Japan would revert from a 
"most-favoured-nation" status to the general tariff, while American and 
British tariff structures would not necessarily alter their trading relation­
ship with Japan. The danger here was that Canada could be left taking 
"directly punitive measures against Japanese trade at a time when neither 
the United Kingdom nor the United States were committed to taking 
similar measures."51 
Although Skelton and Robertson believed that Canada should follow 
the British, they wanted a separate Canadian denunciation which would 
assert Canadian independence and avoid the appearance of taking the 
lead. Skelton, in particular, argued that Canada "should try not to get out 
in front."52 Mackenzie King agreed, but he also feared that "with Japan, 
Italy and Germany together in secret conclave it is hard to believe that 
plans are not already made for simultaneous attacks in the Orient and 
Europe - a ghastly and appaling [sic] situation."53 The fate of the world was 
in the hands of the great powers and Canadians could only hope that peace 
would prevail. 
By the middle of August 1939, the negotiations that had been taking 
place between Craigie and Arita had broken down. The Foreign Office 
decided that it would no longer seek to conciliate Japan for fear of both 
alienating the United States and undermining the Chinese war effort. It 
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was time to take a firm stand. Chamberlain agreed. Japan "had made things 
impossible," he wrote, "... and we must deal with the consequences as best 
we can."54 The Japanese were equally adamant, and towards the end of 
August it seemed almost certain that Britain would go to war with Japan.55 
The situation was saved, most ironically, by the Germans. The announce­
ment of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact on 22 August threw Japan into 
a state of confusion. Japanese diplomacy had been governed by the 1936 
Anti-Comintern Pact and Germany's betrayal of that agreement came as a 
great shock. The Japanese premier resigned on 25 August, on the grounds 
that the emperor had been given false advice, and the Cabinet fell a few 
days later. 
The Nazi-Soviet pact made war in Europe a certainty; it also made 
certain there would be no immediate expansion of the war in the Far East. 
Germany invaded Poland on 1 September and Britain declared war on 
Germany on 3 September. Canada followed suit on 10 September. On 
5 September, the new Japanese government informed Britain that it would 
remain neutral in the European war. Meanwhile, and to the surprise of 
none, the United States also declared its intention to remain neutral. 
Despite the fact that after 22 August most Canadian policy makers 
knew that a war with Germany was imminent, the Far Eastern situation 
continued to be a source of concern. "The world position has changed 
since 1914, particularly in the Pacific," cautioned O.D. Skelton. "The 
defence of Canada," he stressed, 
should be put in the foreground. Many statements have been made in 
the past year or two as to the impossibility in the event of war of 
Canada avoiding attack. If that is so, our first business is to avert that 
attack. Clearly any attack will be on a minor scale, but that minor 
scale may be greater than our shore and off-shore defences can meet. 
It should be emphasized, further, that we cannot in this war ignore 
the Pacific as we did in the last. (We have a potential enemy, not a 
friend, facing us there.) There is a big job in defending our coasts." 
Allowance must be made for the fact that Skelton, who was basically 
opposed to Canadian participation in the war against Germany, was 
attempting to concoct an iron-clad argument so that Canada could keep 
its European commitment small. But his observation contained more than 
a grain of truth. As Hugh Keenleyside pointed out in early September: 
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The importance of Japan as the possessor of the third largest navy in 
the world, as the only major power in Asia and the Western Pacific, 
as the home of one of the greatest merchant fleets in existence, as a 
strong industrial nation, as the possessor of a highly efficient army, 
based on a healthy population of over seventy million, and as the 
inveterate opponent of the U.S.S.R., (which is now apparently pre­
pared to cooperate with Germany] can hardly be exaggerated." 
Many Canadians believed that, as a small power with a population of 
barely 11 million and an almost non-existent Pacific defence system, their 
country presented Japan with a potentially inviting target through which 
it could strike at its enemies. This belief would grow over the next two 
years, and the eventual Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 
would send British Columbia into a state of panic and confusion that 
would have costly repercussions. 
That Canada demonstrated some concern over the Far Eastern situa­
tion in 1939 should come as no surprise. As early as 1935 Lester Pearson, 
then representing Canada at the League of Nations, wrote: 
It is almost platitudinous now to state that Canada's position 
becomes impossible if Great Britain and the United States drift apart 
on any major [Far Eastern] issue. Like many other platitudes, however, 
this one involves a fundamental truth. Canada is a British Dominion. 
She is also an American State. She cannot permit herself to be put in 
a position where she has to choose between these two destinies. Either 
choice would be fatal to her unity! indeed to her very existence as a 
State." 
Fortunately, Canada was not placed in this position in 1939. Instead of 
supporting Japan's aggressive policies, Germany signed a non-aggression 
pact with the Soviet Union, thereby alleviating the tension in the Far East 
between Japan and Britain, and, at least for a time, between Britain and the 
United States. The Canadian government was thus spared the difficulty of 
having to decide whether to go to war with Japan at Britain's side and facing 
the problems that such a conflict would have raised in Anglo-American, 
Anglo-Canadian and Canadian-American relations. Nevertheless, the pos­
sibility was there in 1939, and it is well for historians to realize that Mackenzie 
King's government faced not one, but two, potential threats to Canadian 
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unity during that fateful year. If anything, this makes King's aversion to 
overseas commitments all the more understandable and his accomplishment 
of taking a united Canada into the Second World War all the greater. 
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